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Background and Structure of Regime
The continued progress of the economic integration movement in
Latin America,' one of the priority items to be discussed at the forth-
coming Inter-American summit meeting, underscores the need for
careful study of unresolved legal and quasi-legal economic and politi-
cal problems of the integration process. With the consensus that
industrial development is the backbone of integration and indispens-
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I In the five-nation Central American area, income has increased 5.5%
annually since 1960, with GNP worth $3.8 billion in 1965. Trade within the
Central American Common Market has increased from about $33 million in
1960 to about $140 million in 1965. Significantly, this dynamic growth rested
fundamentally on a great expansion of trade in commercial products, now
estimated at 70% of the total.
In the nine-nation South American and Mexican area, trade within the
Latin American Free Trade Association has risen from $300 million in 1961
to approximately $600 million in 1964. 4 Alliance for Progress Weekly News-
letter, Nos. 27 and 35, Jul. 4 and Aug. 29, 1966. Also see Report of Con-
gressman McVicker on Central America, Subcommittee on Inter-American
Affairs, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 89th
Cong. 2d Sess., "Report on Central America," 13-30 (Subcommittee Print
1966) [hereinafter cited as McVicker Report]. See generally, on LAFTA,
Sidney Del, A Latin American Common Market? (1966); Harry A. Inman,
"Latin American Economic Integration Developments," ABA Sect. Of Int'l and
Comp. Law Bulletin 35-42 (July 1965) and 30-37 (July 1966); Frank E.
Nattier, "LAFTA-The Latin American Free Trade Association," id. at 20-31
(May 1966).
2 Address of President Johnson on the occasion of the Fifth Anniversary of
the Alliance for Progress, The Evening Star, Washington, D.C., August 17,
1966, p. A-17; address of Lincoln Gordon, Assistant Secretary of State for
Inter-American Affairs, 55 Dept. State Bull. 18, 22 (1966).
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able to progress in Latin America,' and in view of the remarkable
five-year record of the Central American Common Market (CACM),
the legal basis and viability of the Integration Industries Regime of
the Central American Common Market deserves close analysis. How
to avoid undue duplication of investments, how to achieve a reasonable
balance in regional growth, and how to implement a common re-
gional system of fiscal incentives to foment greater investment and
fair competition: these questions involve important legal, economic,
and political aspects which neither the Central American Common
Market nor the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA)
has resolved and which any evolving regional common market can
hardly avoid.
The Convention on the Regime of Central American Integration
Industries was signed by the Governments of Guatemala, El Salvador,
Honduras, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica on June 10, 1958." However,
Costa Rica and Honduras did not ratify the Convention (which re-
quired unanimous agreement) so that it did not become effective
until the General Treaty on Central American Economic Integration,
which incorporated the Regime Convention by reference, came into
force in 1961. Article I of the Convention obligates the Contracting
States "to encourage and promote the establishment of new industries
and the specialization and expansion of existing industries within the
framework of Central American economic integration" and "on a
reciprocal and equitable basis in order that each and every Central
American State may progressively derive economic advantages."
Article II provides that Central American integration industries, to
be designated jointly by the Contracting States, are "those industries
which . . . comprise one or more plants which require access to the
Central American market in order to operate under reasonably eco-
nomic and competitive conditions even at minimum capacity."
As provided in Article III, the designation of integration indus-
3 See UN Economic Commission for Latin America, Possibilities of Inte-
grated Industrial Development in Central America, viii (1964); also see
Migual S. Wionczek (Ed.), Latin American Economic Integration: Experiences
and Prospects, 3 (Praeger, 1966); Inter-American Institute of International
Legal Studies, The Inter-American System: Its Development & Strengthening,
Chap. XV, "Latin American Economic Integration," 282-295 (1966).
4Dept. of State (ROCAP), Economic Integration Treaties of Central
America 11 (1966).
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tries is formalized and becomes operative in each case when the
Contracting States sign a protocol stipulating:
(a) the country or countries in which the industrial plants
covered by this Regime are to be initially situated, the minimum
capacity of the said plants, and the conditions under which addi-
tional plants are to be subsequently admitted into the same or
other countries;
(b) the quality standards for the products of the said indus-
tries and any other requirements that may be deemed convenient
for the protection of the consumer;
(c) the regulations that may be advisable as regards the par-
ticipation of Central American capital in the enterprise owning the
plants;
(d) the common Central American tariffs which shall be
applied to the products of Central American integration indus-
tries; and
(e) any other provisions designed to ensure the attainment
of the objectives of this Agreement.
Under Article IV, the products of a firm that has been designated
as an integration industry enjoy the benefits of free intra-CACM
trade as soon as the enabling protocol becomes effective, whereas the
products of firms subsequently established in the same industry are
required to pay a Central American tariff which diminishes 10%
each year from the date specified in the pertinent protocol.' "In
order to promote an equitable distribution of the Central American
industrial integrated plants," the Transitional Article provides that
"the Contracting States shall not award a second plant to any one
country until all of the Central American countries have each been
assigned a plant in conformity with the protocols specified in
Article III."
However, Article IX, which prescribes the procedure for "in-
corporation of a given plant into the present Regime," provides
when the project refers to a plant which forms part of an
industry already covered by a protocol, the Commission may,
in conformity with the terms of the relevant protocol and of this
article, declare that the plant shall be admitted to the benefits
of the present Regime and advise to that effect the Government
of the Contracting State.
Understanding of the industrial development problems inherent
in the Integration Industries Regime requires some appreciation of
5 Carta In/ormativa de SIECA, No. 17, March 12, 1963, pp. 2-3.
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the diplomatic and legislative history of the Regime and related in-
tegration institutions and procedures. The evolution of economic
integration in Central America officially began in 1951 when the
foreign ministers of the five Central American countries established
the Organization of Central American States (ODECA) and the
Economic Ministers established a Central American Committee for
Economic Cooperation.6 The latter Committee, relying strongly
on the Secretariat of the UN Economic Commission for Latin America
(ECLA), undertook detailed analysis, documentation, and negotia-
tions which provided the bases for the Convention on the Integration
Industries Regime and for the Multilateral Treaty on Central Ameri-
can Free Trade and Economic Integration, both of which were signed
in 1958. The Multilateral Treaty provided for immediate free trade
among the Contracting States in some 200 commodities, largely items
not yet produced in Central America, with additional agreements
contemplated for progressive extension of the free trade list to new
commodities so as to achieve a customs union within ten years.
Chapter VIII of the Treaty obligated the Contracting States to "adopt,
by mutual agreement, measures designed to further the establishment
or expansion of regional indusries direced oward a Cenral Ameri-
can common market and of particular interest to the economic integra-
tion of Central America."
In their 1959 Central American Agreement on the Equalization
of Import Duties and Charges,8 the five countries agreed to "set up a
Central American import tariff consistent with the integration and
economic development requirements of Central America" and "to
equalize import duties and charges within not more than five years
from the date on which the present Agreement enters into force."
Clearly, up to 1960, the Central American states gave every evi-
dence of following a policy of gradual and progressive economic
integration envisaging reciprocal benefits for the participating coun-
tries. But, in February of that year, El Salvador, Guatemala, and
Honduras signed a new integration agreement which differed from the
1958 Multilateral Treaty in two pertinent respects: (1) it accelerated
the period of transition to a customs union from ten years to five and
introduced free trade immediately for all (not just 200) commodities,
6 Discussion of the history of the Central American integration program
draws heavily on Sidney Dell, op. cit. supra note 1, at Chap. IV.
' Dept. of State (ROCAP), op. cit. supra note 4, at I.8 d. at III (Article I).
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with the exception of 56 listed commodities, most of which were to be
freed within five years; and (2) it omitted any provision for co-
ordinated industrial development along the lines of the Integration
Industries Regime. The second proposed change is believed to have
been impelled by pressure from special interests favoring greater
freedom for market forces in the integration process, particularly
leaving the location of industry to private enterprise without govern-
mental interference or regulation.' Despite considerable friction
caused by this fait accompli, Costa Rica and Nicaragua, with the aid
of ECLA, were able to effect a compromise of the differences so that
the General Treaty on Central American Economic Integration 10
was signed at Managua in December 1960, and subsequently ratified.
(Costa Rica was the last to ratify, in 1963.)
The General Treaty, which has become the key integration instru-
ment in the area, substantially retained the accelerated free trade
provisions as proposed, but specifically endorsed "all the provisions of
the Agreement on the Regime for Central American Industries" and
bound the signatories to sign "additional protocols in which there
will be stipulated the industrial plants which will be initially covered
thereby, the rules of free trade whch are applicable to their products,
and the other conditions foreseen in Article III of the aforesaid Agree-
ment" (Article XVII). The signatory states also agreed to establish
the Central American Bank for Economic Integration "' to "act as an
instrument for the financing and promotion of integrated economic
growth on the basis of regional equilibrium." The General Treaty
created a Central American Economic Council (Article XX), com-
posed of the respective Ministers of Economy, "to direct the integration
of the Central American economies and to coordinate the economic
policy of the Contracting States." An Executive Council, composed
of a principal official and an alternate designated by each Contracting
State, was also formed (Article XXI) to apply and administer the
General Treaty and to assume the functions assigned to the Central
American Integraiton Industries Commission under the 1958 agree-
ments (Article XXII). A permanent Secretariat (SIECA), serving
9 Dell, op. cit. supra note 1, at 55-56.
10 Dept. of State (ROCAP), op. cit. supra note 4, at V.
11 For text of Convention Establishing the Central American Bank for
Economic Integration, see Dept. of State (ROCAP), op. cit. supra note 4, at
VI. Article II provides, in pertinent part, that "The purpose of the Bank
shall be to promote the economic integration and balanced economic develop-
ment of the member countries."
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both the Economic and Executive Councils, is charged with supervis-
ing implementation of all the integration agreements (Articles XXIII
and XXIV).
To round out the picture of the legal framework and environment
of the Integration Industries Regime, the Central American Agree-
ment of Fiscal Incentives to Industrial Development 12 was signed in
1962. Not yet ratified by Honduras, this agreement sets forth uniform
industrial classification and administrative provisions to replace the
existing industrial development legislation of the member States. It
is particularly noteworthy that the reluctance of Honduras to ratify
this agreement stems from its claim that her economy is less developed
than the other four and should be given special treatment." The
validity of this claim was recognized by the Central American Com-
mittee on Economic Cooperation at its ninth session in January 1966.14
At this same session, the Committee also recommended establishment
of a Central American Commission for Industrial Coordination, com-
prised of presidents of development banks, institutions, and planning
offices with participation and advice of private interests. The purpose
of this commission would be to implement existing treaties for selecting
and promoting regional industries.1"
In its initial draft form, the Regime Convention was a detailed
document containing 40 articles, as compared to the 13 articles in
final form."6 The condensation apparently resulted from disagreement
over interpretation of many of the articles, and the belief that the
rigidity of too much detail should be avoided in favor of broad state-
ments of principles, thereby leaving the specifics for determination in
the separate protocols required for the establishment of designated
integration industries."
As a result of the early recognition of the crucial importance to
CACM of the allocation of development capital among the five Central
1- Dept. of State (ROCAP), op. cit. supra note 4, at VII.
, McVicker Report, op. cit. supra note 1, at 22. At the Sept. 1966 meet-
ing of the Economic Council, it was agreed that Honduras would ratify the
Convention on Fiscal Incentives in consideration of unanimous ratification of
a Protocol to the Convention granting Monduras special treatment. Carta
Informativa de SIECA, No. 60, p. 7, Oct. 12, 1966.
14 McVicker Report, op. cit. supra note 1, at 6.
1, Id. at 7.
16 Joseph Pincus, The Central American Common Market 82 (Dept. of
State (ROCAP), Sept. 1962).
1- Ibid. See El Salvador Ministerio de Economia, Program for the Economic
Integration of Central America, 25 (1959).
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American States, the Integration Industries Regime was established to
give a special status to large-scale industries that needed access to the
entire CACM to operate efficiently. 8 The more economically
advanced States, like El Salvador and Costa Rica, opposed the Regime,
in part, because they believed that they could progress just as well
without it.'0 There was also some thought that the special privileges
granted under the Regime would promote monopolies, and thus
become unworkable and self-defeating. " Honduras and Nicaragua
favored the Regime, presumably because of the protection and the
incentives it provided for industrial development in these countries.
At the same time, there was common agreement that if Central America
were to go into a Common Market "full blast," marginal industries
would suffer unduly, thus requiring some means for facilitating com-
petitive adjustments, such as regional (CABEI) arrangements for
funding plant modernization and technical assistance. o'
Negotiations and Operations Under Regime
Two protocols to the Regime Convention have been signed. The
First Protocol,o- signed on January 29, 1963, and effective for all
states but Honduras, which has yet to ratify, designates two integration
industries: (1) the caustic soda and chlorated insecticides industry
(plants), to be established in Nicaragua (Article 11),-2 and (2) the
tire and tube industry (plant), already established in Guatemala
(Article 19).-2' The Second Protocol, signed November 5, 1965,
and not yet ratified, designates the sheet glass industry to be an integra-
18 McVicker Report, op. cit. supra note 1, at 22.
1" J. Alan Brewster, "The Central American Program for Integrated In-
dustrial Development" in 4 Public and International Affairs, No. 1, 12, 29
(Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton Univ.,
Spring 1966).
20 McVicker Report, op. cit. supra note 1, at 17.
21 Ibid.
2-.For text of First Protocol, see Dept. of State (ROCAP), op. cit. supra
note 4, at IIA.
23Pennsalt de Centroamerica (subsidiary of Pennsalt Chemical Corpora-
tion in the U.S.) and Hercules de Centroamerica (subsidiary of Hercules
Powder Co. of Delaware) were the beneficiaries of the integrated industry
status granted to the caustic. soda and chlorated insecticides industry of
Nicaragua.
.4 Gran Industria de Neumaticos Centroamericana S.A. (GINSA) was the
beneficiary of the integrated industry status granted to the tire and tube in-
dustry of Guatemala Of the firm's total capital in stock shares, about 79%
is reportedly Guatemalan, 15% other Central American, and 6% U.S.
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tion industry (plant) to be established in Honduras (Article 1).21
In the case of each integration industry, the pertinent protocol deter-
mines the (1) sector of application, including deadlines for plant
construction and production; (2) the capitalization and Central
American participation ($4.5 million in the case of the caustic soda
industry, of which at least 40% to be offered to capital of Central
American origin during a period of not less than 180 days); (3) the
productive capacity, including provision for incorporation of addi-
tional plants if required to satisfy regional market demands, subject
to the same obligations and enjoying the same general rights as the
first plants; (4) market supply and distribution requirements; (5) price
and quality controls; (6) additional external tariff protection against
industry-related imports; and (7) tariff advantages on importation of
raw materials.
Final agreement on the First Protocol establishing the tire and
caustic soda industries took approximately two years. The delay was
largely due to the opposition of the United States government (as an
external financing agent) to the Regime on economic policy grounds,
the pertinent doubts of some of the Central American governments
that the Regime was in their best interests, and the ambiguities and
complexities inherent in the provisions of the Regime which entailed a
time-consuming process in the Executive and Economic Councils
for resolution of differences of interpretation and agreement on duty
levels and prices to be included in the Protocol. -6
The position of the United States government was and is that
the provisions of the Regime granting privileges, such as free access
to the regional market, to certain designated firms is discriminatory
and inconsistent with the free trade provisions of the General Treaty.
(Article III grants "free trade to all products" originating in the
"'Carta Informativa de SIECA, No. 45, July 12, 1965, Id. No. 46, Aug. 12,
1965, p. 8. Under the Second Protocol, the integrated industry status awarded
to the plate glass industry in Honduras will lapse unless a suitable company to
produce the glass is formed within six months and in production within two
years after the effective date of the Protocol. Capital ownership is required to
be at least 60% Central American.
2 Discussion of the Regime Protocol negotiations, including the policy
differences between the U.S. and the Central American governments, is based
substantially on the following authorities: Dell, op. cit supra note I at 64-69:
Wionczek, op. cit. supra note 3, at Chaps. 1, 11, VIII, XII, XVII, XVIII; James
D. Cochrane, "Central American Economic Integration: The 'Integrated In-
dustries' Scheme," 19 Inter-Aimerican Economic Aflairs 63 (Autumn 1965);
Pincus, op. cit. supra note 16, at 102-108; McVicker Report, op. cit. supra
note 1.
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signatory states subject only to certain limitations respecting products
listed in Annex A to the Treaty.) It is further contended by some
observers that such discrimination is unlikely to promote economic
integration or optimum industrial development. Thus, it is argued,
the requirement of designating an integration industry in each country
before a second such industry could be designated in any member
country (Transitional Article) tends, at least on paper, to subordinate
the economic principle of comparative advantage in the location of
new factories to the Regime principles of reciprocity and balanced
regional development. It is important to note that the United States
did not allege that the Convention on the Regime necessarily or
specifically conferred monopoly status on the integrated industries
designated, but simply that, in operation, the Regime was discrimina-
tory and likely to result in de facto monopoly. In support of its posi-
tion, the United States government refused to sanction the use of
funds loaned to CABEI in financing firms which were given privileged
status by virtue of having been designated as integration industries.27
In an effort to reconcile the concept of integration industries (in
effect, delaying for ten years the free-trading of competitive products
manufactured in Central America by non-designated plants) with
the CACM concept of regional free trade, the First Protocol (Article
I provides that: "The benefits of the Convention on the Regime of
Central American Integration Industries will not restrict or limit the
commercial interchange taking place under the protection of the
General Treaty of Central American Economic Integration." Since
this restriction applies only to "commercial interchange taking place
under the protection of the General Treaty," it has been construed
as inapplicable to products not yet produced or traded in Central
America.28 Thus, the new industries of caustic soda-insecticides and
plate glass, although not excepted from the right of free trade estab-
lished under the General Treaty, were eligible for integration status
with the resultant withdrawal of that right from any subsequently
established non-designated plants in the same industries.
'While the formulation of the First Protocol was still in progress,
the government of Costa Rica proposed that Industria Firestone
de Costa Rica, S. A. (to be 70% controlled by the Firestone Tire and
Rubber Co. of Akron, Ohio) be granted integration industry status.
27 Brewster, op. cit. supra note 19, at 16.
28 Andrew B. Wardlaw, "The Operations of the Central American Common
Market," 60 (ROCAP Mimeo. 1966); Brewster, op. cit. supra note 19, at 15-16.
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This proposal resulted from Firestone's earlier application for permis-
sion to establish a tire factory in Costa Rica under that country's
Industrial Encouragement Law. While the Costa Rican proposal was
rejected by the Executive Council on the ground that it had not been
reviewed by the Central American Institute of Research and In-
dustrial Technology (ICAITI), as required by Article IX of the
Regime Convention, there was by then substantial agreement at the
Council level that integration industry status should be given to the
GINSA tire plant in Guatemala and that, subject to study by ICAITI,
the regional market would not justify a second tire plant before 1967.
Nevertheless, anticipating this additional plant, Article 27 of the
Protocol provides that the Executive Council may, by majority vote
(without a special protocol), designate, for integration status, addi-
tional plants in an integration industry, provided that such plants
must offer 60% of their capital stock to Central American investors
and at least 30% of the capital must be subscribed by them.
After signature of the First Protocol designating GINSA, Fire-
stone persisted in supporting its proposal with the government of Costa
Rica, including a request for assurances of privileges for its products
comparable to those accorded GINSA. In the meantime, a Nicaraguan
proposal was submitted for another tire plant to be financed and
controlled by Central Americans." In this somewhat delicate situa-
tion, the question of a second tire plant under the Regime was taken
up by the Economic Council, which reached agreement in February
1965, on the terms for eventual establishment of a second tire plant.3"
Continuing on this liberalized approach, the Second Protocol to the
Regime (designating the Honduran plate glass industry) provided
for
The incorporation [into the System of Integration Industries] of
such additional plants as required to satisfy the demand of the
Central American Market . . . without the need for a new
Protocol, by decision of the Executive Council, adopted by ma-
jority vote in accordance with procedures set forth in Article
IX of the Convention on . . . Integration Industries, and sub-
ject to the same conditions regarding composition of capital,
prices, quality and guarantee of supply, established in this Pro-
tocol for the initial plants, with the same privileges for all.
Interestingly, the agreement by the Economic Council for desig-
nation of a second tire plant for integration industry status provided,
"9 Carta In/ormativa de SIECA, No. 40, pp. 4-5, Feb. 12, 1965, pp. 4-5.
:11 Ibid; Id. at 13-14.
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in part, for at least 70% of the capital stock to be Central American-
owned, 3 contrary to the 70% control Firestone had retained in its
prior agreement with Costa Rica under the Industrial Encouragement
Law. In May 1965, rather than curtail its control of Industria Fire-
stone, and apparently willing to assume the cost of the gradually
declining tariff imposed on non-integration industries, Firestone ad-
vised the government of Costa Rica that it would consider waiving
the provision in its contract which obligated the Costa Rican govern-
ment to obtain for Firestone free access (integration industry status)
to the Central American market. At the same time, the Economic
Council kept the door open by recommending further study of the
implications should Firestone's tire plant be established as an integra-
tion industry. 3
In the course of negotiations to put into effect the First Protocol
establishing, in Nicaragua, a caustic soda-insecticide integration in-
dustry, Nicaragua agreed to the automatic extension of Protocol
rights to any additional caustic soda-insecticide plants to be estab-
lished within CACM. It seems clear that Nicaragua made this con-
cession in order to assure the flow of capital funds through CABEI
for the development of its caustic soda-insecticide plants. It is interest-
ing to note, also, that Nicaragua is the only Latin American country
with which the United States has entered into a friendship, com-
merce and navigation treaty containing an anti-restrictive business
practices clause.3" This clause provides for consultation when either
party feels that its trade is suffering harmful effects from practices of
private or public commercial enterprises of the other party which
restrain competition, limit access to markets, or foster monopolistic
control. Each party further agrees to take such measures as it deems
appropriate to eliminate problems caused to the other.
Finally, it should be noted that the First Protocol (Article 32) in-
corporated a proposal, intended as an alternative to the Regime,
known as the Special System of Promotion of Productive Activities.
Under the Special System, the Economic Council may, by means of
31 Ibid.
32 Carta In/ornativa de SIECA, No. 45, p. 5, July 12, 1965, p. 5.
23 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, U.S.-Nicaragua, signed
Jan. 1, 1956; entered into force May 24, 1958; 9 UST 449, TIAS 4024, 367
UNTS 3 (Article XVIII). Also see Statement of Anthony M. Solomon,
Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, before the Subcommittee on
Antitrust and Monopoly, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong.,
2d Sess., Aug. 29, 1966, at 786 of transcript.
International Lawyer, Vol. I, No. 4
678/ INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
protocols, subject to ratification by the national legislatures, designate
industries for Special System status, and grant additional external
tariff protection (i.e., higher than those provided in the Tariff Equaliza-
tion Convention) to the products of such industries as soon as local
capacity covers at least 50% of the regional demand. 4 Together
with the Integration Industries Regime, this Special System was
specifically recommended by the Central American Economic Co-
operation Committee for establishing industries economically in
Honduras." .
From the history of the negotiations, it is reasonable to conclude
that a majority of the CACM members, while generally aware of the
monopolistic dangers and the administrative difficulties involved, are
adhering to the Integration Industries Regime as a political-legal
means of assuring rational, equitable, and balanced industrial de-
velopment within the region. At the same time, experience indicates
that, while member states and corporations, including joint ventures
with foreign and domestic capital interested in establishment within
CACM, will press strongly for integration industries status, failure to
achieve such status will not necessarily deter such corporations
from establishing as non-integration industries, depending upon the
contract terms with the host state.
Evaluation of Regime
In terms of its principal economic purpose of promoting "the es-
tablishment of new industries and the specialization and expansion of
existing ones," the achievement record of the Integration Industries
Regime over the five years of its existence is not impressive. Of the
three integration industries designated to date, only one (the GINSA
Tire Company) is operational; the caustic soda-insecticide and plate
glass plants have yet to be built." Since Honduras has not ratified
the First Protocol, even the GINSA plant is receiving integration
benefits in only four countries.
For reasons to be discussed, it would probably be unfair to judge
the progress of the Regime in comparison with the remarkable increase
of trade which has occurred under CACM. Nonetheless, certain
obstacles to the success of the Regime are identifiable. In the first
34 McVicker Report, op. cit. supra note 1, at 22; Wardlaw, op. cit. supra
note 28, at 76-81.
38 McVicker Report, op. cit. supra note 1, at 18.
" Wardlaw, op. cit. supra note 28, at 60.
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place, there is common agreement that the procedures for imple-
mentation of the Regime are unduly cumbersome and time-consuming.
Based on experience to date, it is estimated that a company seeking
integration status must be prepared for three to five years of negotia-
tion and delay before it can reasonably expect concrete benefits from
such status, if granted. 7 Under the Regime Convention (Article IX),
each application for integration industry status is made to SIECA.
Thereafter, it is transmitted, with months of study usually required at
each stage, to the Executive Council and ICAITI, and then, in pro-
tocol form, to the Economic Council for consideration. If all mem-
bers of the Executive Council sign the protocol, it then goes to the
national legislatures for ratification. This may take several years,
three ratifications being necessary to make the protocol effective as
to the first three ratifying states.
To accelerate these processes of designation and ratification, the
Central American Economic Cooperation Committee, at its January
1966 meeting, adopted resolutions proposing (1) a Central American
Commission on Industrial Coordination to assist SIECA and the ap-
propriate Councils to select and study industries to be considered for
integration status, and (2) approval by all five national legislatures
of a formal protocol authorizing the Economic Council to award
integration status to industries, without the necessity of ratification
by the separate legislatures. 8 While considerable progress may be
made in expediting the designation process if initiatives along the
lines of the first proposal are carried out, it is very doubtful that the
national legislatures will soon be willing to transfer to the Economic
Council or any other organ of the Regime the sovereign power neces-
sarily entailed in any waiver of their right to ratify each designation of
a new integration industry."9
At the same time, the series of official levels of consideration and
study currently involved in the designation process may, to a certain
extent, constitute a desirable check on unwise or too precipitate exer-
cise of political power in favor of special interests or undue "log-
rolling" to the detriment of valid economic considerations. Actually,
it is difficult to envisage any process or procedure affecting so impor-
tant a sector of the national economies that could be completely
insulated against all undue political influence. The present process may
371d. at 68, 74. Also see Brewster, op. cit. supra note 19, at 12-13, 27.
38 Wardlaw, op. cit. supra note 28, at 74-75.
39 Id. at 75, 101.
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very well be serving a useful function as a safety-valve mechanism for
absorbing and moderating the political maneuvering and turmoil which
usually accompanies the bargaining and decision-making process
between these sovereignty-conscious nation-states as they seek to
adjust to the requirements of economic development on a regional
basis."
A second obstacle to the operation of the Integration Industries
Regime is the difficulties of interpreting the actual provisions of the
Regime Convention and predicting, with reasonable certitude, the
operational effects of such interpretations in practice. From a strictly
legal standpoint, certain provisions of the Regime are imprecise and
ambiguous. For example, the word "industry" has been used in the
Regime Convention to mean an entire industry per se, a firm or
enterprise, and a plant or factory. This becomes important in defin-
ing the specific beneficiaries of any given grant of integration industry
status. In practice, the designation of an integration industry under
the Regime has meant, in the absence of any different specification,
the application of privileges and responsibilities to a single plant in a
particular industry. 1
The more complex interrelated concepts of "reciprocity," "bal-
anced development," and "competition," which are embodied in the
legislative history, if not specific provisions of the Regime Convention,
are also subject to differing interpretations. 2 Under the Regime Con-
vention (Article I), integration industries are tobe established on a
"reciprocal and equitable basis," and this idea of reciprocity means
that the distribution or location of selected industries among the
CACM countries should be in accordance with economic considera-
tions, but with each country receiving some industries. Similarly, the
Transitional Article precludes designation of a second plant for a
40 As Dell has concluded:
It would be dangerous to underestimate the political difficulties in-
volved in securing prompt joint action by a group of independent
governments, even if they all act with the best will in the world.
The utmost political ingenuity will be required in working out forms
and procedures for intergovernmental co-operation that will make
it possible to advance on a regional level without holding back pro-
gress nationally.
Dell, op. cit. supra note 1, at 216-217.
41 See McVicker Report, op. cit. supra note 1, at 17.
42 Pincus, op. cit. supra note 16, at 102-103; Carta Informativa de SIECA,
No. 52, Feb. 12, 1966, pp. 16-17, 21-22; Wardlaw, op. cit. supra note 28, at 82
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country until each of the five countries has been assigned a plant.
However, in practice, and particularly to accommodate the second
tire plant sought by Firestone, this Article has been interpreted by the
Economic Council as being a restriction on the designation of plants
in the same industry, but not of plants in different industries. 3 The
same concept of reciprocity is found in other CACM treaties dealing
with free trade internally and with common external tariffs, such as
the Convention on Fiscal Incentives, which seeks to equalize and
standardize the concessions which the countries may grant to attract
new industry," without permitting special treatment for any one
country.
On the other hand, the concept of "balanced economic develop-
ment," expressly stated in Article II of the Convention establishing
CABEI, requires that a special effort be made to grant greater com-
pensatory benefits to the less-developed countries within CACM. As a
case in point, the failure of Honduras to ratify the Regime Protocols
and the Convention on Fiscal Incentives stems primarily from its
reluctance to act until it is assured of the special assistance to which
it feels entitled.4" The previously noteddiscussions and resolutions of
the Economic and Executive Councils clearly reflect awareness of an
obligation to alleviate the evident disparities in economic development
and benefits derived by the different countries under CACM.
While the Regime is principally concerned with the establishment
of new industries on a regional basis, the fact that it also provides
(Article II) that such industries must operate under "reasonably eco-
nomic and competitive conditions" makes the meaning of the concept
of competition also important to a fair evaluation of the Integration
Industries Regime, particularly in the long run. The conflict between
the generalized free internal trade and fair competition provisions of
the General Treaty creating CACM and the provisions on preferential
internal and external tariff treatment of selected privileged firms under
the Regime has been previously noted. Numerous observers, including
the United States government, contend that the attempt to establish
new regional market scale industries in this way under the Regime
does not promote reasonably economic or competitive conditions,
but, to the contrary, promotes discriminatory and monopolistic
conditions.
43 Wardlaw, op. cit. supra note 28, at 92.
44 Id. at 83, 88.
., Id. at 84-85.
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There is considerable evidence to support this contention. The
designated integration industry is protected from free market competi-
tion internally for ten years by the progressively declining internal
tariffs, and protected indefinitely from external competition (imports
from outside CACM) by the higher external tariffs prescribed in
the pertinent protocol. In this protected status, it is possible that these
privileged industries may not make optimum use of their initial eco-
nomic advantage by preparing for eventual tougher competition from
non-integration industries. They may even seek to prolong, unduly,
the period of external tariff protection they enjoy, and thus extend
monopolistic or market-dominating positions which might delay the
efficient production of quality products at lower costs to the consumer.
On the other hand, supporters of the Regime contend that, given
their countries' limited resources of capital, skilled labor, technical
know-how, and consumer income, and the inequality of competition
among them, owing to differences in natural environment, geography,
productivity, wage levels, technical progress, and human capacities,
the Central American governments must legislate market incentives
conducive to development in order to encourage establishment of
new industries within CACM. By giving priority to reciprocal and
balanced development through the rational allocation process of
regional specialization and decentralized concentrations, the Regime's
architects seek to minimize wasting scarce resources, harmful competi-
tion, and undue concentration of production in light consumer goods
and assembling during the critical period of establishment of dynamic,
basic industries.
As a case in point, Prebisch has cited the automobile industry in
the LAFTA area, where "[n]ot only are there a number of countries
all trying to do the same thing, but there is also an incredible pro-
liferation of anti-economic plants within a single country." " To
counteract this type of development, the Montevideo Treaty, establish-
ing LAFTA, itself provides for complementarity agreements (prefer-
ential arrangements) between LAFTA countries closely linked by
geographical proximity or common interests which provide for appor-
tionment of the manufacturing of various parts and components used
in the same production process. 7 The Treaty does require the con-
currence of two-thirds of the participating countries and sets a time
limit for each complementarity agreement. Initial establishment, and
46 Wionczek (Ed.), op. cit. supra note 3, at 142-145.
41 Bela Balassa, The Theory of Economic Integration 173 (1961).
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not ruinous competition from an excess number of competitors, is
the problem in CACM. But the LAFTA experience, and the fear that
a freely competitive market may be dominated initially by foreign
corporations whose production and pricing techniques and competitive
expertise are often superior to many of the small, new domestic enter-
prises are factors influencing the Central American countries to favor
a policy of more government regulation."8
While the proper interrelation of competition and economic inte-
gration is a controversial subject, involving many variable factors
about which even experts may reasonably disagree, there is substantial
economic theory and empirical evidence to support the general ap-
proach of the Regime. The European Coal and Steel Community, for
example, composed of highly industrialized countries, acknowledges
the limitations of unregulated free competitive forces in developing an
integrated area, and the need for Community intervention where
competition is not expected to achieve the social and economic goals
of the Community." In Europe, as in the United States, the laws
aim at promoting efficiency and protecting the consumer public from
abuses. But, in applying these laws, Europeans, not unlike Latin
Americans, are inclined to uphold the validity of restrictions on com-
petition unless they are unreasonable, i.e., unduly coercive or clearly
injurious to the public. This enforcement policy is based on the honest
belief that "competition may be ruinous and wasteful, and that co-
operation may 'rationalize' competition by making it more efficient." "
Even the United States government, while pursuing its long-estab-
lished policy of carrying on lending and credit operations so as not to
strengthen or extend business practices that restrain competition, limit
access to markets, or foster monopolistic control, "recognizes that at
times limited protection may be needed in the establishment of new
enterprises in less-developed countries." " The point is that a fair
comparative approach to evaluation of the Regime must recognize
that the competition protected in the United States by the Sherman
4S Id. at 10.
4 Fernand Spaak, "Problems of Competition and Restrictive Trade Prac-
tices in the European Coal and Steel Community," 1960 Institute on Legal
Aspects of the European Community 118, 120 (Federal Bar Association, 1960).
-"Eugene D. Bennett, "Comparison of U.S. and Foreign Antitrust Laws,"
Sect. of Int'l and Comp. Law Bulletin 14 (ABA, Dec. 1958), 787.
5" Statement of Assistant Secretary of State Anthony M. Solomon, op. cit.
supra note 33, at 787.
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Antitrust Act 52 is part of an over-all economic problem which is
viewed differently abroad. 3
In any event, supporters of the Regime contend that, while it does,
in fact, run the risk of creating monopolies, this is a calculated risk
which need not necessarily come to pass. Various controls are referred
to as adequate safeguards for avoiding abuses of the monopolistic
provisions and effects of the Regime Convention." These controls
include the previously noted provisions in the Protocols for the regu-
lation of prices and qualities of the products of integration industries,
as well as the power of the Regime organs to manipulate external tariffs
to guarantee market supply. Also, the Regime Convention does not
preclude the establishment of a plant under national law which could
compete with an integration industry plant, and which would have the
benefits of the industrial incentive laws of the particular country,
including freedom from the Regime Protocols' requirements for Cen-
tral American participation in capitalization of the new plant.
Furthermore, the Regime organs themselves have, in practice,
tended to permit entry of second plants either by liberal interpretation
of the pertinent provisions of the Regime Convention or by relying
on more easily applied alternatives to the Regime, such as the Special
System on Promotion of Productive Activities, which involves only
external tariff protection as the principal market control. Also, in at
least one instance (the Nicaraguan caustic soda-insecticide plant), the
designated integration industry has voluntarily agreed to the designa-
tion of additional plants in the industry.
Finally, the designation and allocation process itself is character-
ized as a rational process which must be agreed to by all five countries,
based on comprehensive, continuing sectoral studies, research, and
advance planning to identify priority industries of possible and de-
sirable regional scope."
The effectiveness of these various checks on prospective monopo-
lies and anti-competitive practices, while not yet completely tested, is
5226 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 1 and § 2 (1964).
53 Bennett, op. cit. supra note 50, at 19-22.
5 4 Wardlaw, op. cit. supra note 28, at 70-73.
" See ECLA, op. cit. supra note 3, which presents nine preinvestment studies
covering rolled steel, welded tubes, glass containers, sheet glass, electric lamps,
caustic soda, chlorine and chlorine insecticides, petroleum products, petroleum
refining, and viscose and acetate rayon. Also see ECLA, Report of the Central
American Economic Cooperation Committee, 13 Dec. 1960-29 Jan. 1963,
12 E CN. 12 CCE 303 Rev. (1964).
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subject to considerable doubt. The technical complexity and politi-
cally sensitive judgments involved in determining reasonable prices
for products of designated plants and in verifying their quality give
limited assurance that these controls can be effectively implemented. 6
As the internal tariff protection under the Regime progressively de-
clines, integration firms may attempt to replace this protection with
monopolistic price agreements and anti-competitive market-sharing
arrangements.
Unlike the European Common Market (Rome) Treaty (particu-
larly Articles 85 and 86), the CACM Treaty and the Regime Con-
vention are largely silent respecting regulation of private firms which
may seek to protect themselves through restrictive business or trade
practices. 7 This regulatory gap is especially significant in view of
the economic milieu in Latin America generally, where, until recently,
competition rarely transcended the bounds of gentlemen's agreements
made among a few families in each of the several branches of in-
dustry." Despite the pressure of a growing number of socially pro-
gressive entrepreneurs employing modern technical, managerial, and
competitive methods, and the increased difficulties encountered in
restraining competition through traditional, circuitous political de-
vices, the average Latin American industrialist still tends to embrace
notions antithetical to competition, his exhortations in defense of
private enterprise notwithstanding. 5
Another factor to be weighed is the anti-competition effect of
market forces other than the exploitative power of monopolies and
collusive oligopolies. In South and Central America, as in Europe,
factors "such as close personal relations between individual businesses,
the quest for a quiet life and stable income, and the under-estimation
of demand elasticities, contribute to the policy of low turnover and
high profit and inhibit effective competition." 60
It is easy to understand how the foregoing definitional and opera-
tional uncertainties, interpretative difficulties, and adverse cultural-
56 Brewster, op. cit. supra note 19, at 29-30.
5r Regime Convention Articles XI-XIV do afford CACM member states
the privilege of referring suspected unfair trade practices, particularly those
relating to export subsidies, to the Executive Council for determination and
possible remedial action.
5 Frank Brandenburg, The Development of Latin American Private Enter-
prise 38 (National Planning Assn. 1964).
59 Ibid.
60 Balassa, op. cit. supra note 47, at 165-166.
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environmental factors may have inhibited and discouraged industrial
expansion and establishment in CACM under the Regime. At the
same time, the fact that non-designated industrial firms are expanding
or entering the area in ever-increasing numbers "' may be partially
attributable to the generating or attracting effect of the few integration
industries so far designated. However, some of these firms establishing
within CACM have indicated either unawareness of or unconcern
with the Regime. 2 While such an attitude may be partially attributable
to ignorance, it is consistent with the principal conclusion reached by
Schreiberg that all investment decisions are individual cases which
vary with the type of industry, experience in the area, company size,
individual inclinations and desires, and a large number of other com-
mercial and legal factors, with a profitable market remaining the most
important single factor.63 The proposed ultimate merger of CACM
and LAFTA into one Latin American Common Market, while not
imminent, may also have a deterrent effect on firms reluctant to enter
into the long-term regulation and commitments on the basis of a
limited five-nation market which integration status under the Regime
entails. It also may well be, as innovations such as the Special System
of Promotion of Productive Activities suggest, that the Regime is no
longer intended to be more than a special purpose vehicle for estab-
lishing key industries in substantial accordance with the important
principles of reciprocity and balanced economic development. Some
believe that the objective of promoting balanced, competitive in-
dustrial development without duplication of investment can best be
achieved through national incentive programs conducted on a re-
gional scale, and by perfecting the common market organs, initiatives,
and agreements not yet fully implemented."4
Other factors of a non-economic nature may have some bearing
on the viability of the Regime. The Central American governments
may not wish to antagonize ECLA, which was instrumental in insti-
tutionalizing the Regime as well as CACM, especially since the real
commitments under the Regime become operative only with the signa-
l1 Wionczek, (Ed) op. cit. supra note 3, at 291; McVicker Report, op. cit.
supra note 1, at 21-22.
Cochrane, op. cit. supra note 26, at 72; Norberg, op. cit. supra note 1, at 17.
63 Sheldon L. Shreiberg, "The United States Private Investor and the Central
American Common Market," The George Washington University International
Law Society, Studies in Law and Economic Development (Study No. 2), 170-
173 (Sept. 1966); Brewster, op. cit. supra note 19, at 28-29.
14 Brewster, op. cit. supra note 19, at 31.
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ture of the Protocols, which are subject to a deliberate process of
negotiation. Also, the pronounced opposition of the United States gov-
ernment to the Regime may have the political effect of fostering sup-
port of the latter by the Central American governments as a demon-
stration of their independence, an image vital to political power and
leadership in Latin America.65
In conclusion, it may be stated that while the Integration Indus-
tries Regime rests on a reasonably sound, albeit imperfect legal founda-
tion, its economic effectiveness and viability as a means of industrial
development in CACM has yet to be demonstrated. A preponderance
of the evidence to date suggests that the Regime is more likely to fall
into disuse than to become a dynamic tool for regional industrializa-
tion.66 The elimination or control of the adverse administrative, dis-
criminatory, and monopoly-tending aspects of the Regime are likely to
prove difficult for a number of economic, political, legal, and social
reasons. However, there is some reason to hope and expect that the
Regime administrators and policy-makers will be able to simplify the
procedures for speeding up implementation of the Regime, and to
keep faith with the concept of reasonable competition without
jeopardizing the concepts of reciprocity and balanced economic de-
velopment."7 Much will depend upon the courage, vision, competence,
leadership, and public (regional and continental) mindedness of
the officials who govern the Regime, as well as of the industrialists
and investors who participate in CACM.6"
Above all, and despite its controversial history since inception,
the Regime has become an imperative political instrument for the
Central American countries at this stage of their development as a
region. As a legal instrument of authentic Latin American origin, the
Regime is distinctive as a legal innovation-some would say experi-
ment-for accommodating, rationalizing, and facilitating the co-
61 Id. at 16.
66 Id. at 25-35; Wardlaw, op. cit. supra note 28, at 75.
67 See ECLA Report of the Central American Economic Corporation Com-
mittee, op. cit. supra note 55.
61 For differing opinions as to the reasonableness of relying upon government
officials rather than businessmen for the regulation of industrial development
in CACM as well as the relative merits of the total corporate ownership mix
for such development, see Wionczek (Ed.), op. cit. supra note 3, at 150-151
(Prebisch) and 213 (Mikesell); Cochrane, op. cit. supra note 26, at 73. Also
see John D. Harbron, "The Dilemma of an Elite Group: The Industrialist in
Latin America," 19 Inter-American Economic Affairs, No. 2, 43, 46 (Autumn
1965); Frank Brandenburg, op. cit. supra note 58, at Chaps. II and III.
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existence, if not the fusion of two differing economic development
philosophies (free enterprise and planned economy) in the interest
of progressive regional economic integration. A comparative ap-
proach to evaluation of the Regime must take account of the different
economic and sociological views and values of the nations involved.
Respect for and patience with such an approach is consistent with the
increasing role of Latin Americans in exercising leadership and re-
sponsibility for their own economic salvation. In any event, the Inte-
gration Industries Regime is likely to continue, for the foreseeable
future, as an experimental instrument for promoting industrial de-
velopment in CACM, especially in the less-developed countries, with
varying degrees of vitality and modifications as circumstances change
and experience accrues.
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